I. Introduction 1
The floating of the Mexican peso in December 1994 renewed interest in the insights offered by theoretical models of speculative attacks on exchange rate regimes. In particular, is it possible to empirically implement one of the speculative attack models to provide an "early warning" of regime fragility? Although relatively few in number, existing applications of the speculative attack models offer some chance for useful predictive performance (see Blanco and Garber (1986) and Goldberg (1994) for applications to Mexico). This paper assesses the predictions from a standard speculative attack model, using the recent floating of the Mexican peso as a test case.
From the outset it is important to realize that the recent Mexican experience differs in several important respects from the highly stylized situation modelled in the speculative attack literature. First, in most speculative attack models the government is pursuing an expansionary fiscal policy, forcing rapid domestic credit creation that is eventually inconsistent with the fixed exchange rate regime. 2 Market participants realize this inconsistency and exhaust the government's stock of international reserves at a moment such that the transition from a fixed to floating regime does not entail a discrete jump in the exchange rate. The recent Mexican experience was not characterised by such expansionary fiscal policy. 3 Second, the speculative attack literature assumes that monetary authorities do not sterilise the loss of reserves at the time of the collapse, leading to a discrete jump in the money supply. This was not the case in Mexico, as pointed out by Folkerts-Landau and Ito (1995) and more formally by Flood, Garber and Kramer (1995) . Third, the standard log linear speculative attack model does not allow domestic credit to become negative, although this is precisely what happened in Mexico to the domestic credit aggregate associated with the monetary base, the monetary aggregate most directly controlled by the Banco de Mexico. Therefore, arguably the most relevant measure of domestic credit cannot be used in the analysis, severely limiting the usefulness of any results. 4 Finally, almost all of the speculative attack models are adaptations of the simple monetary model of exchange rate determination (see Obstfeld (1986a) and Penati and Pennachi (1989) for explicit optimisation models), so that these models miss elements such as a weakened banking sector and political instability that were important parts of the recent Mexican experience . 5, 6 1 Thanks to Greg Sutton for helpful discussion and Florence Béranger for helpful comments and research assistance. 2 The models of self-fulfilling (Obstfeld (1986b) and ) and contagious speculative attacks (Gerlach and Smets (1994) ) are not predicated on expansionary fiscal policy.
3 With the possible exception of the fiscal easing associated with the run-up to the presidential election in 1994.
Despite all the above qualifications with regard to Mexico, it still remains an empirical question whether the speculative attack models can generate useful early warning signals. Mexico is an ideal country for estimating a speculative attack model, given its many regime changes over the past twenty years. Therefore, the paper proceeds with estimation for Mexico, providing some insight on early warning capabilities, and as a by-product offering the first simultaneous estimation of a speculative attack model. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section II presents and solves a speculative attack model. Section III discusses the application to Mexico and presents estimation results. Conclusions are found in Section IV.
II. The model
We consider a relatively straightforward amalgamation of the monetary models of exchange rate determination used to study speculative attacks by Goldberg (1991) , Flood and Hodrick (1986) , and Flood and Garber (1984) . 7 The basic equations are:
( 
See the recent work of Miller (1996) for a speculative attack model that incorporates domestic banking considerations.
7 A useful survey of the speculative attack literature is found in Agénor, Bhandari and Flood (1992 (4) assumes that deviations from purchasing power parity follow a first-order auto regressive process. Output is demand determined, increasing in the relative price of foreign to home goods, and decreasing with increases in the real interest rate, as in equation (5). Equations (6) and (7) describe the evolution of foreign inflation and interest rates. Both variables mean revert around a long-run average level. The money supply is defined in equation (8) as the sum of domestic credit and reserves, while the process for domestic credit is specified in equation (9).
Under a fixed exchange rate, the above model can be solved for the level of reserves, after equating money supply to money demand. Under a floating regime, the level of the spot exchange rate can be solved for in the same fashion. However, in this case, the process by which expectations are formed must be specified. Throughout we will assume that expectations are formed rationally, that is that they are model consistent.
II.1 Collapse probabilities
The central result of the collapsing exchange rate literature is that a collapse will occur whenever the floating rate that would be realised in the event of an attack ( % s t ) is expected to be above the fixed exchange rate (s t ). This must be the case, since a speculator could earn expected profits at an infinite rate by buying the foreign currency at s t just before the collapse and selling the foreign currency at % s t just after the collapse. Arbitrage (the existence of other speculators) will eliminate the opportunity for these profits by driving % s t to s t at the time of the collapse. Put another way, the collapse will occur at such a time to eliminate any expected jump in the exchange rate in the transition from a fixed to floating regime.
In order to derive the collapse condition, it is necessary to first solve for % s t . This is done by rewriting equation (1), after substituting for i q p t t t
, and , to yield (10) 
The method of undetermined coefficients will be used to postulate a rational expectations solution for % s t . Naturally, the solution will involve the variables in equation (10), as well as their period t +1
expectations. Equations (6) and (7) 
= +
In conjunction with equation (11), assuming that θ t is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ θ allows for the following calculation Goldberg (1991 and 1994) avoids the problem by specifying the entire model in levels. This leads to an unrealistic money demand function and creates difficulties in forming the rational expectations solution for the exchange rate.
It is now possible to postulate an appropriate functional form for the method of undetermined (10) 
The unconditional probability (as of time t − 1) of a collapse to a floating rate regime at time t can then be calculated as (4), (6), (7), (9) and (11) At the time of a collapse, foreign reserves will be fixed at some level as authorities no longer intervene in the exchange market. This level is denoted above by R .
II.2 Likelihood function
Ideally, estimation of the structural parameters of the model and the probabilities of collapse should be done simultaneously. In earlier work this has not been done. Rather, Goldberg (1994) , Cumby and Van Wijnbergen (1989) , and Blanco and Garber (1986) 
The likelihood of observing the realized random variables over the entire sample period t = 1 to T can then be written as 
where f x
x t denotes the density function for the random variable x . Notice that the probabilities of observing either c t = 1 or 0 are conditional on the errors from the other equations in model.
Evaluation of the likelihood requires a specification for the joint density (the first term in the likelihood) as well as a specification for the conditional density that can be used to calculate the 9 The derivation of the likelihood follows Melick (1987) .
conditional probabilities that make up the remainder of the likelihood. Given the assumptions of independence and normality, the joint and conditional densities can be derived, except for a single complication. Notice that the use of the approximation in equation (11) function, the likelihood cannot be evaluated. To proceed, the simplifying assumption that R = 0 is used, implying that the authorities will defend the regime until they run out of reserves. As can be seen by examining equation (16), this eliminates e − θ from the likelihood, allowing it to be written as: Using the change of variable technique, the conditional density for c t can be calculated. These details are left to the appendix. Denoting the standard normal probability density function and cumulative distribution function as φ and Φ respectively and using the results of the appendix, the log likelihood
Using equations (1), (2), (6), (7), and (9) to substitute for θ ψ ω η The log likelihood can be split into five pieces; four least squares estimations corresponding to equation (7), a combination of equations (1) and (2), equation (9) 
= ⋅
These restrictions force the likelihood to be maximised jointly.
III Application to Mexico
There is considerable interest in whether the floating of the Mexican peso in December 1994 was predictable. Moreover, prior to December 1994, Mexico had a long history of essentially fixed exchange rate regimes, with many changes to the fixed rate parity since 1976. Therefore
Mexico is an ideal country for estimating the model derived in Section II, offering sufficient variation in c t .
III.1 The data
For reasons of data availability, the estimations cover the period 1975 through 1994 at a monthly frequency. Table 1 lists the dates of the Mexican exchange regime collapses during this period, with collapse defined as either a devaluation or a switch to a more flexible regime (for example an increase in the rate of a crawling peg). Identifying the appropriate time series that correspond as closely as possible to the theoretical constructs of the model in Section II is not entirely straightforward. This is especially true for the money supply (m) and domestic credit (d ). Ideally, the concept of base money recently targeted by the Banco de Mexico and its companion net domestic credit should serve as the empirical constructs for m and d . 11 However, the log-linear structure of the model does not allow for nonnegative variables, ruling out the use of these two series. As a second-best solution, alternate constructs of domestic credit and money were used. The advantage of this measure of domestic credit is that it includes credit extended by the development banks. Finally, the United States was treated as the foreign country. The data series used for each variable in the model are listed in Table 2 , with all data coming from the International Monetary Fund IFS data tape. Chart 1 plots the natural logarithms of the data. There are two features of the data worthy of mention. First, s is formally undefined during floating exchange rate periods, of which there were several between 1975 and 1994. During these periods a collapse is impossible, complicating any estimation across the full sample period. To circumvent this problem, s was defined to equal 999.999 new pesos per dollar, a value large enough to force the probability of a collapse to zero (see equation (16)). Second, an improvement in data collection procedures within Mexico produced a discontinuity in domestic credit in December 1977.
This can clearly confound estimation and interpretation. Therefore, as discussed further in Section III.2, several estimation periods will be used. 
III.2 Estimation results
As noted above, the likelihood can be separated into five independent, easily estimated pieces when parameter restrictions are ignored. With the restrictions in place, the likelihood can be separated into two pieces, one involving parameters b 1 through b 20 and a second involving parameters b 21 through b 25 . To ensure that the entire log likelihood was coded correctly, four OLS and one probit equation were estimated and compared to the unrestricted maximum likelihood results. For each parameter the results were identical. 12 With the restrictions in place the two pieces were maximized independently to ease computational burdens. In all results reported below, estimation results are from the Constrained Maximum Likelihood (CML) application module for Gauss version 3.2.14.
Parameter estimates from both the unrestricted and restricted models are in Table 3 , with the likelihood ratio test of the six restrictions also shown. As can be seen from equation (23) rate (i * and π * respectively) from equations (6) and (7). Reduced form coefficients in Table 3 imply that the US Treasury bill rate mean-reverted around an annual rate of 7.0 percent, with 2.5 percent adjustment per month whenever away from this rate. Corresponding figures for the US inflation rate are mean reversion around an annual rate of 3.8 percent, with a much too large 52 percent adjustment per month toward this rate. In part, all of these negative results stem from the simplistic functional forms assumed in the model. Unfortunately, the use of more realistic functional forms would render the derivation of the likelihood function intractable. Finally, as can be seen at the bottom of Table 3 , the restricted version of the model is soundly rejected.
More to the point of the predictive nature of the exercise, Chart 2 presents the withinsample fitted values (from both the restricted and unrestricted model) of the conditional collapse probabilities, along with the times of the actual collapses. These fitted values are calculated using equation (A8), that is using the actual values of the variables at time t to generate estimates of $ , $ , $ $ θ ψ ω η 13 The results are very disappointing. The unrestricted probability of a collapse is equal to one for each of the twelve months, while the restricted probabilities are basically flat at roughly .10 for each of the twelve months. Neither set of probabilities generates a reliable signal that could have served as an early warning indicator.
As mentioned above, the jump in domestic credit in December 1977 is troubling. In fact, the jump generates a spurious increase in collapse probability, as can be seen in Chart 2. To ensure that the above results are not sensitive to the discontinuity, the model is estimated over the shorter period 1978:01-1994:12. Results are found in Table 4 and Charts 4 and 5 that mimic in form Table 3 and Charts 1 and 2. Results are very close to those from the longer estimation period. Again, the main conclusion that the model does not generate a useful early warning indicator continues to hold.
Even though negative, the prediction results are not much worse than those found in earlier studies. Blanco and Garber (1986) Garber were able to make use of the futures market for pesos that was active over their estimation period. Access to an asset price that directly incorporates devaluation expectations will improve any estimation. Secondly, both Blanco and Garber and Goldberg examine periods which better fit the assumptions of the standard speculative attack model. A better case can be made that fiscal profligacy lay behind the collapses in the 1970s and 1980s than that of December 1994. Evidence of this second point can be found in Chart 6. Here, collapse probabilities are calculated for 1984 and 1985, estimating the model through 1983. The restricted probabilities form a smooth series that peaks at .1 just before the July 1985 collapse. The somewhat obvious point is that estimation will bear more fruit for periods in which the stylised assumptions of the model come closest to capturing reality.
13 A more computationally intensive calculation would involve re-estimating the model for each month in 1994.
14 Aside from Blanco and Garber (1986) , plots of these results can also be found in Folkerts-Landau and Ito (1995) . 
IV. Conclusions
This paper presents, solves and estimates a speculative attack model of exchange rate . .
